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Abstract
This work offers an approach to conceptualizing,
demarcating and analyzing a national web. Instead of
defining a priori the types of websites to be included in
a national web, the approach put forward here makes
use of web devices (platforms and engines) that purport
to provide (ranked) lists of URLs relevant to a particular country. Once gathered in such a manner, the
websites are studied for their properties, following
certain of the common measures (such as responsiveness and page age), and repurposing them to speak in
terms of the health of a national web: Are sites lively,
or neglected? The case study in question is Iran, which
is special for the degree of Internet censorship undertaken by the state. Despite the widespread censorship,
we have found a highly responsive Iranian web. We
also report on the relationship between blockage,
responsiveness and freshness, i.e., whether blocked
sites are still up, and also whether they have been recently updated. Blocked yet blogging portions of the
Iranian web show strong indications of an active Internet censorship circumvention culture. In seeking to
answer, additionally, whether censorship has killed
content, a textual analysis shows continued use of
language considered critical by the regime, thereby indicating a dearth of self-censorship, at least for websites
that are recommended by the leading Iranian platform,
Balatarin. The study concludes with the implications of
the approach put forward for national web studies,
including a description of the benefits of a national web
health index.

Introduction:
National web studies
In 2007, Ricardo Baeza-Yates and colleagues at Yahoo!
Research in Barcelona published a review article on
characterizations of national web domains, where they
sketched an emerging field, which we would like to call
national web studies. Of particular interest in the article
is the distinction the authors made between studies in
the 1990s on the characteristics of the web to those a
decade later on national webs (Kehoe et al., 1999; Baeza-Yates et al., 2007). The term national web, we feel,
is useful for capturing a historical shift in the study of
the Internet, and especially how the web’s locationawareness repositions the Internet as object of study. A
national web is one means of summing up the transition of the Internet from “cyberspace,” which invokes
a placeless space of email and packets, to the web of
identifiable national domains (.de, .fr, .gr, etc.) as well

as websites whose contents, advertisements and language are matched to one’s location. The notion of the
national web, we argue, is also worthwhile beyond the
conceptual. It enables the study of the current conditions of a web space demarcated along national lines,
as Baeza-Yates and colleagues pointed out in comparing one national web with another. As we would like to
pursue here, it also may be useful for the study of conditions not only of the online, but also of the ground.
That is to say, national web studies are another example
of country profiling.
Here, building upon the web characterization work, we
provide an approach to the study of national webs that
provides an overall rationale for their study (why study
a national web) and engages a series of methodological
debates (how to study a national web).Where the latter
is concerned, we put forward an approach that is cognizant of the multiplicity of user experiences of the web
as well as the concomitant web data collection practices that users may actively or passively participate in.
Search engines and other web information companies
such as Alexa routinely collect data from users who
search and use their toolbars, for example. Platforms
where “crowds share” by posting and by rating are
also data collection vessels and analysis machines. The
outcomes of these data gathering and counting exercises are often ranked lists of URLs, recommended to
users. When location is added as a variable, the URL
lists may be country or region specific. The same holds
for language; namely, websites are served that are
in whole or in part in a particular language. Thus, in
practice one is able to speak of country-specific and/or
language-specific webs organized by the data collected
and analyzed by engines, platforms and other online
devices. There is a caveat: users of these devices draw
upon their own data, and are recursively provided a selection of considered URLs. Such personalization may
influence the country and language-specific URLs
served however, to date the impact on search engine
results appears to be minimal (Feuz et al., 2011). Consequently, the effects of personalization are not treated
here (Pariser, 2011).
We term the interaction between user and engine, the
data that are collected, how they are analyzed, and ultimately the URL recommendations that result, “device
cultures.” In the case study below, we discuss a series
of device cultures and the kinds of national webs they
organize. We discuss a blogger’s, an advertiser’s, a
surfer’s, a searcher’s and a crowd’s web, each formed
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by the online devices and platforms that collect their
data and ultimately purport to represent or provide in
one manner or another a country-specific and/or language-specific web. Put differently, we are making use
of web devices that “go local,” i.e., devices that not
only collect but serve web content territorially (which
is usually nationally) or to a particular language group.
In certain cases the two distinct meanings of going
local are reconcilable; in other cases they are not. An
engine may serve language-specific websites originating from inside the country as well as from outside the
country in question. For example, in return for a query,
the Bolivian “local domain Google” (Google.com.bo)
may just as well serve results from Spain or Colombia
as from Bolivia, with all being in Spanish. Thus when
discussing the demise of cyberspace, and the rise of a
location-aware web, there is a tension between two
new dominant ways of interpreting the object of study:
national webs versus language webs. We are sensitive
to the tension between the two new manners of
approaching the web after cyberspace, and are aware
that “the local,” which as mentioned above is how
Google terms its national domain engines, may refer to
either a national web, a language web or both.
We also discuss approaches to demarcating a national
web, including sampling procedures. We are particularly interested in the fruitfulness of research outcomes
from both keeping separate as well as triangulating
the various parts of a national web—the blogger’s,
the advertiser’s, etc. Are the URLs that are listed as
“top blogs” by blog aggregators similar to the URLs
that are listed as interesting by crowd-sourcing platforms? Does the list of URLs with high traffic, and
available advertising space for speakers of a particular language (i.e., Persian), resemble that of the most
visited websites in a related country in question (Iran)?
We conclude that keeping the parts of the web and the
lists of URLs separate may be beneficial, as a national
blogosphere may have different characteristics than a
national crowd-sourced web.1
Where the overall rationale for studying a national web
is concerned, it implies not only a critique of the web as
placeless space, and as universalized; it is also a means
to develop further analyses of relationships between
web metrics and ground indicators. That is, another
aim of this study is the consideration of digital methods
1 The data for this study are online at the project website,
http://mappingiranonline.digitalmethods.net/.

Page 2

to understand the significance of national web space.
By digital methods we mean algorithms and other
counting techniques whose inputs are digital objects,
such as links and website response codes, and whose
application pertains to, but ultimately moves beyond,
the study of online culture only (Rogers, 2009). We discuss metrics for analyzing the health of a national web,
such as its responsiveness, freshness and accessibility.
We have experimented with such analyses before, seeking to diagnose the condition of Iraq (in 2007, some
four years into the Iraq War) by looking at “its web.”
We found a broken web. Iraqi university websites were
down, or had their domains poached and parked. Iraqi
governmental sites were suffering from neglect, with
the exception of the Ministry of Oil (oil.gov.iq), which
was bilingual and regularly updated. In our brief foray
into the state of Iraq via the Iraqi web, we sought to
develop a series of metrics for diagnosing the health of
a web, which are both conceptual as well as empirical.

Blocked yet blogging:
The special case of Iran
The case study in question is Iran.2 It is in many respects
a special case, not least because the term national web
itself may be interpreted to mean the separate Internetlike infrastructure that is being built there (Rhoads and
Fassihi, 2011). It is also a special case for the scale
and scope of Internet censorship undertaken by the
state, which is coupled with the repression and silencing of voices critical of the regime. In other words,
the Iranian web is experienced differently inside Iran
than it is outside of Iran, which is of course the case
for all countries where state Internet censorship occurs.
It is also seemingly authored differently from outside
than from inside Iran. As a consequence many Iranians online, either site visitors or authors, whether
inside or outside the country, need to cope with censorship. Inside the country, coping could mean being
frustrated by it, and waiting for a friend or relative to
bring news about a VPN or another means of getting
around blockages. It could mean routinely circumventing censorship through VPNs, proxies, Google
Reader and other means. Both inside and outside the
country, coping may mean actively learning about (and
consciously not using) banned words, and perhaps em2 According to the International Telecommunication Union, 13% of the
Iranian population uses the Internet and 21% of Iranian households have Internet access (2011). The marketing research reports an urban concentration
of users, with “the vast majority (being) young, mostly 15 to 40” years of
age (NetBina, 2010: 10). Figures on the Iranian diaspora are not available.
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ploying code words and misspellings instead. It could
mean self-censorship. The degree to which Iranians
online express themselves in times of censorship is of
interest here. Dealing with online thuggery is another
matter, which we are aware of, but do not cover in any
detail. For example, one may be warned or pursued
by the Iranian cyber army (Deibert and Rohozinski,
2010). One copes, or protects oneself, through the
careful selection of one piece of software or platform
over another, based on which one provides safeguards
and forms of anonymity. One may use wordpress.com
for the ease with which one may choose a new email
address as a login, or Friendfeed for the capacity to
change usernames.
Having mentioned some of the reasons why it is a
special case, we also would like to point out that certain
general metrics such as site responsiveness and freshness may be put to good use when studying countries
such as Iran. For example, if sites are blocked by the
state, yet still responding and updated, one may have
indications of a reading audience, both outside but also
inside Iran. One may have indications of widespread
censorship circumvention, as we report. Here in particular the retention of the separate webs in our sampling
procedure is beneficial. That is, the Iranian blogosphere, or the Iranian bloggers read through Google
Reader and indexed by Likekhor (a website that rates
websites by ‘likes’), are roundly blocked by the state,
yet remain blogging. “Blocked yet blogging” may be
the catchphrase for at least certain vital parts of the
Iranian web.
Perhaps not often recognized as such, national webs
are nevertheless routinely created. It may be said that
national webs come into being through the advent of
geo-location technology, whereby national (or language) versions of web applications (such as Google)
are served nationally (Google.gr for Greece) together
with the advertisements targeted to locals and information in compliance with national laws (Goldsmith
and Wu, 2006; Schmidt, 2009). Notably, it is the search
engine whose mission statement is universal access
that is at the forefront of the rise of the national and
the demise of placelessness (Google, 2011a). Eric
Schmidt, Google’s former chief executive officer, has
explained that at Google.com there is information delivered that is legal in the United States, and illegal in
other countries. Google asserts that when a result is on
Google.com it is essentially controlled by Google U.S.
and under jurisdiction of U.S. law. Google thus offers

local search engines that are compliant with local laws.
One of the earliest and most commonly used examples by Google executives (and by the search engine
industry more generally) is that pro-Nazi material is
illegal in Germany (and France), and Google omits
those websites in their local domain search engines,
Google.de and Google.fr (Schmidt, 2009; Whetstone,
2010). Google also abides by national youth protection
laws, for instance in Korea by enabling Safe Search
by default. In such cases, Google’s results page states
the number of returns that have been removed for legal
reasons (Whetstone, 2010). Google.cn is the most wellknown as well as controversial instance of localization,
whereby Google’s Chinese engine filtered results drastically. It took a novel approach in 2010 by redirecting
users of Google.cn (China) to G
 oogle.com.hk (Hong
Kong), where Google does not filter, according to the
company (Drummond, 2010a; Drummond, 2010b).
There is, of course, further literature to draw upon
when studying national webs, from the pioneering ethnographic study of the national web of Trinidad and
Tobago, where not global but rather Trini culture is
performed, to well-known works on media as organizing national sentiment and community more generally
(Higson, 1989; Anderson, 1991; Miller and Slater,
2000; Ginsburg et al., 2002). In policy studies, too, national webs, or portions of them, are increasingly
“mapped” to inform debates about the extent to which
the web, and especially the blogosphere, organizes
voice (Kelly and Etling, 2008; Etling et al., 2010). Of
interest is the related work that seeks to build tools to
circumvent censorship so that voice is still heard
(Glanz and Markoff, 2011; Roberts et al., 2011). In library science, national webs are routinely constructed
by national libraries and other national archiving projects, which also have considered how to define such a
web (Arvidson and Lettenström, 1998; Arms et al.,
2001; Abiteboul et al., 2002; Koerbin, 2004). There are
variously sized national web archives. Countries that
have legal deposit legislation for web content as well
as books (such as Denmark) tend to have notably
larger web archives than the countries that do not (such
as the Netherlands) (PADI, n.d.; Lasfargues et al.,
2008).
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Defining national websites,
and the implications for
national web capture
Archivists’ definitions of national webs and national
websites are of special interest in our undertaking. How
do national libraries define national webs and websites? What may we learn from their definitional work?
For example, the Royal Library of the Netherlands,
following similar definitions of a national website from
archiving projects in other European countries, defines
a website as “Dutch” if it meets one or more of the following tests.
What is a “Dutch website”? It is a Dutch website, if it
is:
a) Dutch language, and registered in the
Netherlands;
b) Any language, and registered in the
Netherlands;
c) Dutch language, registered outside the
Netherlands; or
d) Any language, registered outside the
Netherlands, with subject matter related
to the Netherlands (Weltevrede, 2009).
The above scheme for what constitutes a national
website, or at least one deemed relevant for a national
archiving context, has consequences for their collection. Here in the first instance we would like to discuss
how a definition affects the collection technique, automated or by hand. If one were to begin with sites from
the national domain (.nl), those sites in Dutch (and
ones in other languages) may be automatically detected with software, and in the collection procedure, one
would remove from the list .be sites (from Belgium,
where Dutch, or Flemish, is also spoken), unless they
treated Dutch subject matters. (Dutch national web
archive users likely would be surprised to come upon
Belgian websites stored in it for whatever reason!)
The Royal Library’s could be described, however, as
an editorial approach, for especially websites related
to Dutch subject matters and websites in Dutch but
registered outside of the Netherlands (outside of .nl)
pose particular challenges to automation, and working at scale. As a research practice, one would not be
able to automate the detection and capturing of those
sites; one would more likely create a list of them, before routinely capturing them over time. In the national
web characterization studies, reviewed by Baeza-Yates
Page 4

in 2007 and discussed at the outset, the national domain (known as the country code top-level domain, or
ccTLD) is the o rganizing entity. In practice, however,
many countries (or nationals) use URLs outside of their
national domains, such as .com, .net and .org. As we
note below, for Iran, sites with the .ir ccTLD in fact
may not be the preferred starting points for demarcating a national Iranian web. As a case in point, in our
data the percentage of .ir sites that is blocked is very
low, compared to .com’s, for example. Thus .ir seems
to have characteristics that differ from other sites authored and/or read by Iranians.
In order to describe the considerations an analyst may
have when beginning to demarcate a national web, and
at the same time to direct these thoughts to the specificity of Iran, we first surveyed a selection of Iranian
bloggers about the “Iranian web,” and particularly the
very ideas of an Iranian website as well as a national
web.
We are particularly interested in contrasting definitions of a national web that are “principled” with those
based on device cultures. By principled we mean a
priori definitions of what constitutes a national web
and a national website, such as the archivist’s above.
By device cultures we mean the webs that are formed
by collecting and analyzing user data, and outputting
leading sites of a country and/or language. We mentioned above some of the consequences of demarcating
a national web when national websites of interest to
archiving are based on formalist properties of their
content. It becomes difficult to make a collection at any
scale.
In preliminary research about the very notion of an Iranian web, a small survey, undertaken by a New Media
M.A. student at the University of Amsterdam, was made
of Iranian bloggers using Google Reader (Gooder) in
the student’s Gooder network (n=141) (Zarrinbakhsh,
2011). A variety of definitions of a national web were
put forward, and the respondents were asked to choose
which definition was best suited. (They could choose
multiple answers.) From the beginning, the question
was met with suspicion, as the term itself was seen
as a possible ruse by the Iranian government to create its own Internet, and further isolate the country and
the people, as the student reported. In comments on
the question, it was written that the Internet is a “free
sphere” and ideas of a national web would “limit” such
freedom.
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The questions read as follows: What is an “Iranian
website”? It is an Iranian website, if it is:
a) Only in the Persian language
b) In Persian and other languages (and dialects)
spoken in Iran
c) Authored by Iranians
d) Related to Iranian issues
e) Accessed by Iranians
f) National domain (.ir)
g) Returned by Google
Note first the expansion of considerations for what
would constitute a national web beyond what we have
related so far, both in national domain characterization
studies but also in the case of the constitution of the
Dutch web by the Royal Library. In particular, sites
accessed by Iranians and those returned by Google are
newly added candidate constructs of an Iranian web,
where the former treats the Iranian web like a traditional media consumption survey: Which sites are most
visited? The last question about Google’s relationship
with the Iranian web is more ambiguous. Google could
be equated with the web generally, as its entry point.
Or, one could find the Iranian web with Google.
As a whole, twelve percent believed that only Persian websites could be considered national websites.
Thirty-one percent checked the box for Persian websites and other languages and dialects spoken in Iran.
Forty-five percent thought that when Iranians produce
the content, it could be counted in the area of a national web. Twenty-nine percent were of the opinion
that everything related to Iranian issues is in the area
of the Iranian national web. Nineteen percent were of
the opinion that the websites accessed by Iranians show
their national web. It should be noted that some people
were very much opposed to this choice; they mentioned that every website can be accessed by anyone,
so this item seems to be ill conceived. Four percent of
the total respondents chose websites with the Iranian
domain (.ir), implying that national web studies relying
on the domain only would prove unpopular. Nine percent thought that websites that appear in Google search
results make up the (Iranian national) web.
Finally, in a follow-up question addressing the issue of any difference between writing from inside or
outside the country, approximately one-third of the respondents seemed to agree with the communications
scholar, Gholam Khiabany:

If Iranian blogs are defined in terms of language, this means omission of a large number
of Iranian bloggers who write in other languages, most notably English, while including
a number of bloggers from Afghanistan or
Tajikistan who write in Persian. Focusing on
Iranian bloggers writing inside the country
also leads to excluding a large number of Iranian bloggers writing in Persian outside Iran
(2007:565).
On the basis of these survey findings, and extending Khiabany’s thought, the analyst concluded that a
national web could be defined as one that is authored
by Iranians, no matter their location or language in
which they write, and no matter the subject matter.
Such a definition of the national web appears to include
sites with content authored by Iranians outside of Iran
in languages other than Persian, on issues that may not
be related to Iranian affairs. This is a case whereby the
definition makes it nearly impossible to demarcate an
Iranian web! In any case, detecting sites authored by
Iranians outside of Iran in languages other than Persian
would require manual work. It may be worth noting
that the definition adhered to by the Royal Library of
the Netherlands also required manual work, but did not
expand its definition of Dutch sites to sites authored
by Dutch people abroad in languages other than Dutch,
unless the subject matter was Dutch-related.
Having considered and discussed what we have termed
principled approaches to defining national websites
and webs, we instead chose to analyze the outputs of
devices, which we come to again in more detail shortly.
That is, methodologically, we do not begin with a priori definitions of what constitutes an Iranian website, or
the Iranian web, however fascinating in a formalistic
and ontological sense. Rather, as we explain and eventually defend, we rely upon the URL recommendations
made by dominant web devices and platforms, which
through different algorithms and logics are deemed
relevant for a specific country and/or language.
Our contribution to national web studies informs
the literature on national web characterization, as
discussed in the opening, as well as on policy studies
(and political science) about the organization of voice
online. It also contributes to media theory and web
studies by putting forward the national web as object
of study. The overall approach is not only conceptual
but also empirical, in that we seek properties of naPage 5
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tional web spaces that are indicators of conditions on
the ground. Such properties could be how responsive a
national web is at any given time, and how accessible.
Are responsive sites also fresh, or recently updated?
Are sites that are blocked still responsive and fresh?
We are also interested in more than the technical web
data sets, and how they may be repurposed for social
study. As alluded to already, for Iran in particular the
content of websites is carefully monitored by the state;
websites may be blocked and website authors may be
pursued. In the following, we put forward an approach
to demarcating a national web, in order to study its current conditions, including analysis of changing degrees
of expression and voice (2009-2011).

Demarcating the Iranian web:
Studying the outputs of device
cultures
The purpose of the research is to demarcate a nominal
Iranian web, and analyze its condition, thereby providing indications of the situation on the ground. By
nominal web we mean one that is predicated on the
means by which it is organized by online devices and
platforms as well as retrieved, both by the user and by
the analyst. Here we have chosen to demarcate an Iranian web through multiple, dominant online approaches
for indexing and ordering that “go local,” and privilege
language, location and audience, broadly speaking.
Working in July 2011, we found that the web given
by three crowd-sourcing platforms aimed at an Iranian
audience differs from that yielded by a marketing tool
for Persian-language advertisers, a surfer pathway aggregator of users in Iran, and a search engine delivering
.ir sites as well as other top-level domain sites from the
“region,” even though each purports in some general
or specific sense to provide the Iranian web. Ultimately we have chosen to write about the Iranian webs in
the multiple, and discuss each web’s characteristics.
We thereby addressed an issue faced by the analyst
when formulating where to start collecting URLs, be
it in terms of compiling seed URLs to crawl, stringing
together keywords and operators to form a query, consulting lists of top blogs by inlink count, top URLs by
rating or top websites by hit count, etc. For our analysis
we selected the outputs of the well-known aggregators
of Iranian or Persian-language websites, in a sense not
choosing one starting point, but retaining them all—or
at least a number of significant ones.
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We also took decisions with respect to dealing with
the idea that a sample of the Iranian web would follow (only) from knowledge of its population. As we
discuss, in the national web research area one may be
confronted by expectations of knowing the population
of a web (in terms of the number of websites, and some
categorization of their types), and being able to make a
sample from it and from its types. In thinking through
such an undertaking, one may port scan the Iranian
IP ranges and establish whether IP addresses respond
to the standard HTTP and HTTPS ports 80, 8080,
or 443. One would count how many web servers are
active within a specific IP range, and in a second step
roughly estimate the number of domains. Alternatively, one may consider approaching the Iranian Internet
authority or Iranian ISPs for their data. Or, one could
crawl a seed list of URLs, or multiple lists, in snowball
techniques, and subsequently sift the large catch by language-detection software and/or whois lookups. When
one begins to rely on web services that have ceilings or
have issues with spammers and scrapers (which is most
if not all of them), then the challenges of (relatively)
big online data become apparent. One is unable to run
batch queries without permission from corporate research labs, Internet administrative bodies and o thers.
Just when it is becoming interesting, the research focus
turns to the administrative, legal and social engineering arenas, bringing everything to a standstill. Research
that gains the access, and finishes the large collecting
and sifting project, become great achievements in
themselves. Whilst we have undertaken one mediumscale scraping and querying exercise for this research
project, we largely avoid the techno-administrative
arena we refer to above, and instead seek to make use
of what is available to web users. We make a conscious
choice in favor of relatively small data.
Furthermore, we would like to make a case for a
method to demarcate a national web (or “webs”) that
is sensitive to the variety of ways one enters web space
by belonging to particular device cultures, which we
largely equate with engine and platform operations,
instead of in an ethnographic sense (where an object
may have a spirit, for example). Generally, we introduce national web demarcation methods that repurpose
web devices that not only “go local,” but also capture
device cultures. In short, we are interested in capturing
national device cultures. Repurposing web devices has
two methodological advantages. First, popular devices
may be viewed as mediating and quantifying specific
usage. The devices do so by recursively soliciting user
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participation in content production and evaluation.
They calculate the most relevant websites by aggregating links, clicks, views and votes, thereby outputting
collectively privileged sources. Second, the definition of an Iranian web is outsourced to the big data
methodology used by devices to order content, which
combines algorithmic techniques with large-scale user
participation. Relatively small data sets are obtained
from the output of these big data devices. Put differently, the repurposing of web devices is both a strategy
for the small data researcher to sample from a big data
set as well as a means to have samples that represent
specific outlooks on how to organize and order web
content, as we explain in our discussion of the privileging of hits, links, location, likes and other measures by
the platforms and devices under study.
In the analyses, we wish to chart language and other
formal features that are in each Iranian web. More
conceptually, in our particular approach to national web studies, we also would like to discuss which
portions of the web are healthy, in the sense of (still)
online and active, and which are broken, in the sense
of unresponsive. Additionally, we are interested in the
extent to which each is censored or filtered by the state,
and whether there is a relationship between responsive
(and fresh) websites and filtered websites. In order to
pursue the question of whether censorship kills content, which we have formulated in a previous (and
preliminary) project on the Tunisian web (prior to the
“Arab Spring” of 2011), we developed means to chart
changes to a special part of the Iranian web over time.
Here we use time-series data from Balatarin, a leading
crowd-sourced platform which we scraped, comparing
the significant URLs voted up around the presidential
elections in 2009, with those of the same time period in 2010 and 2011. First we ran the hosts through
proxies in Iran so as to check for indications of blocking. Generally we found that Balatarin’s collection of
URLs is particularly susceptible to blocking. We also
analyzed the use of particular words (“fiery language”),
in order to make findings about voice online in times
of 
suppression and repression. We are particularly
interested in the relationship between the use of that
language on websites and the blocking of those same
sites. Do the authors of the webpages continue to use
language that would have their sites blocked? Generally, we discuss our findings in terms of the strength,
clarity and volume of voice, which we describe. Prior
to reporting on the longitudinal analyses, first, in the
following, the indexing and ordering mechanisms of

the web platforms and devices relevant to the Iranian
space are described. The data culled from these platforms and engines are employed to characterize the
web types on offer.

Device cultures: How websites
are valued and ranked
The early web was organized by amateur as well as
professional link list makers, who took on the mantle
of a librarian or specimen collector, and made directories of websites, organized by category. Professional
or “pro-am” website categorization by topic remains,
in the larger-scale directories such as Yahoo! as well
as in smaller-scale collections, though the practice
arguably has declined in the face of the other methods
(which we describe here) that have become more and
more settled as dominant approaches online for valuing
websites (Deuze, 2007; Bruns, 2008). These approaches of valuing websites we couch in technical as well
as politico-economic terms as the “hit economy,” “link
economy,” “geoweb,” “crowd-sourcing,” and the “like
economy,” which highlights what is counted, by whom
and/or where. Crowd-sourcing, a term coined by the
Internet trade press that derives from the practice of
outsourcing, also has been described as the “workerbee economy,” where both the so-called wisdom but
also the labor of the crowd pollinates the beneficiary,
often a Web 2.0 company or service (Howe, 2006;
Moulier-Boutang, 2008). The other term we employ,
the geoweb or locative web, has less of the connotation
of a particular kind of economy, yet contains the means
by which sites are sourced.
The hit economy, once exemplified by the hit counter
on early websites, ranks sites by the number of hits
or impressions, where unique visitors count. For such
a view we have chosen DoubleClick Ad Planner by
Google (referred to here as Google Ad Planner), which
is a service that ranks sites by audience for the purposes
of advertisers. Whilst “Iran” is not among the countries
listed (which likely owes to a combination of the lack of
a .ir local domain Google as well as the U.S. economic
sanctions against Iran), Persian-speaking is among the
site type categories in the available audience analytics.
Thus one Iranian web would be comprised of those
sites that reach a Persian-speaking audience, as collected and ranked by Google Ad Planner. Using the options
available, 1,500 unique hosts for a Persian-speaking
audience were collected from Google Ad Planner.
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The “link economy” is a term that describes the rise
of PageRank and other algorithms that value links
(Rogers, 2002). It also captures a shift in URL ranking
logics away from an advertiser’s model (hit-counting)
to a more bibliographic or scientometric manner of
thinking (citation or link-counting). The term is used
to characterize Google Web Search, however, much of
the other main component to the algorithm apart from
link-counting is user click-throughs. Searching Google
for .ir sites (including .ir’s second level domains) as
well as Iranian sites in generic top-level domains in
Google’s regional search, yielded some 3,500 hosts.3
Alexa, like other companies offering browser toolbars,
collects user location data such as a postal code upon
registration, and once the toolbar is installed, tracks
websites visited by the user (see Figure 1). It thereby
keeps records of the sites most visited by user location.
Alexa furnishes a list of the top 500 sites visited by
users in Iran.
Crowd-sourced sites such as the most well-known
(Balatarin) and its emulators (Donbaleh and Sabzlink) require registration before the user may suggest
a link, which is then voted upon by other registered
users. Those URLs with the most votes rise to the top.
For this exercise, we collected approximately 1,100
different hosts from Balatarin, 2,850 from Donbaleh
and 2,750 from Sabzlink.4 In the following analyses we
grouped the two crowd-sourcing platforms Donbaleh
and Sabzlink, for they share the device culture (crowdsourcing). Together they resulted in 4,579 unique hosts.
We treated the other crowd-sourcing platform, Balatarin, separately. The special treatment arises from its
status as a highly significant Iranian website.

2008 (Wikipedia, 2011). It also has been pivotal for the
Green Movement in the opposition before and after
the Iranian presidential elections in 2009 (Iran Media
Program, 2010). The recognition of Balatarin as a platform for the opposition also provides the opportunity
to employ it as a barometer in studying the continuing strength, clarity and volume of that voice. Do the
websites that are recommended on Balatarin continue
to express themselves critically, or have they discontinued the use of language critical of the regime? By
strength of voice, we examine the continued use of
the words. To study clarity, we examine whether the
words they choose are fiery and side-taking or coded.
Volume is whether there are more and more voices that
are using the words: Is the chorus (so to speak) growing louder?
The introduction of the like button and other social
counters in social media has brought with it what one
may term the “like economy,” which values content
based on social button activity (Gerlitz and Helmond,
2011). Likekhor, as the name suggests, ranks websites
by likes; the likes are tallied from Google Reader users
who have registered with Likekhor. Google Reader, or
Gooder (as some Iranian users call it), is of particular
interest because through it one has been able to read the
contents of websites that are otherwise filtered by the
state. Google Reader thus effectively acts as a proxy
to access filtered websites. At Likekhor the focus is on
blogs, pointing up a relationship between Google Reader users and bloggers, or blog readers. From Likekhor
we extracted a list of 2,600 hosts, which are collected
from a page where all blogs on Likekhor are listed.

Launched in 2006, Balatarin is considered the first
Web 2.0 site in Persian, and has been recognized as
one of the most popular Persian websites in 2007 and
3 Google.com’s web search was chosen for its dominance in Iran among
users of search engingooes. Data from 2010 list search engine market shares
in Iran as follows: Google 90.78%, Yahoo 4.97%, Bing 3.64%, Ask Jeeves
0.46%, AOL 0.07% (MVF Global, 2010). Another marketing research firm
lists 2011 market shares in Iran as Google 87.15%, Yahoo 7.27%, Bing
4.16%, Ask 0.70%, AOL 0.12% and Lycos 0.01% (Net Applications, 2011).
According to Alexa in October 2011, Google.com is the most visited site in
Iran, followed by Yahoo.com. We employed site queries in Google.com for
the top level (site:.ir) as well as the second level domains (e.g., site:.co.ir),
and concatenated the results. The query technique did not allow for the redirecting to a local domain oogle. Because cookies had not been retained, it
also did not allow for the personalization of the results.
4 In order to compare the different platforms we chose to compare hosts
instead of full URLs. That is, for Balatarin, we harvested all the URLs listed
on the 150 pages of “hot” links, resulting in 1102 unique hosts.
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Figure 1: Alexa toolbar installation and registration
process, with field for user’s postal code, August 2011.
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Thus, in July 2011, we collected more than 10,000
unique hosts through platforms and devices significant
to Iranian users (Google Reader, Google Web Search
and the crowd-sourcing platforms) and two that provide ranked lists of Iranian or Persian-speaking sites
(Alexa and Google Ad Planner) on the basis of data
collected from users located in Iran (Alexa) or from
Persian-writing users (Google Ad Planner). We will
characterize these Iranian webs individually as well as
collectively. We have chosen not to triangulate them,
for very few websites recur across them.

Analyzing the characteristics
of the Iranian web: Language
and responsiveness
One area of research that we build upon is web characterization studies, where one of the main difficulties
repeatedly discussed is how to obtain a representative
sample of a national web or other web types. According to Baeza-Yates and colleagues, the three common
types of sampling techniques used in web characterization studies are “complete crawls of a single web
site, random samples from the whole web, and large
samples from specific communities” (2007: 1). For
national webs, which the authors consider to be specific communities, the list is comprised of websites with
the same ccTLD (country code top-level domain). For
many national webs, however, such delimiting would
be too partial, certainly for countries where generic toplevel domain usage is prevalent. Our approach seeks to
retain the .com’s, .org’s, .net’s, etc. when deemed relevant for Iranians and Persian-speakers by the devices
and platforms upon which we rely.
To the sampling techniques described above, we thus
would like to add a fourth type which could be called
multiple aggregator site scraping, or more conceptual-

ly, device cultures. Google Ad Planner, Alexa, Google
Web Search, Likekhor (Google Reader) as well as the
crowd-sourcing platforms (Donbaleh, Sabzlink and
Balatarin) make available (either through query re
sults or dynamically-generated listings) websites that
are relevant for Iranians and Persian speakers. In our
case, with the exception of the searcher’s web (gained
through .ir and generic TLD queries in Google’s region
search), the percentages of .ir sites among the significant hosts outputted by the devices are relatively low
(see Table 1). The crowd-sourced web references the
fewest .ir sites at just over 10 percent, whilst that of
both the advertiser’s as well as the geoweb, or web
of surfers in Iran, has the highest percentage at about
25 percent. As noted earlier, the .ir sites in our overall
collection of URLs are much less likely to be blocked
than the .com sites. Of the websites that are tested and
found blocked from inside Iran, 80 percent are .com,
followed by .net with 6 percent and .org with 4 percent.
The ccTLD .ir has 3 percent of all censored hosts.
Having reviewed how samples are generally made,
Baeza-Yates and colleagues compared the ten national
web studies, in order to arrive at a core set of measures
that are shared across many of them (see Table 2).
Our characterization of the Iranian web (or webs) has
a particular point of departure that benefits from the
metrics on offer. In reference to the metrics in Table
2, in the category of content our project shares interest in language, page age and domain analysis (albeit
top-level), and in the category of technology, relies on
HTTP response codes. The codes yield what we refer to
as “responsiveness,” which we consider a basic health
metric, together with page age, the freshness measure.
There are other metrics that we do not employ, though
we would like to mention how to do so. Brokenness
could be gleaned from link validators, where it would
refer to broken links on a site. Additionally, establish-

Table 1: Percentage of .ir sites in top websites collected from device cultures
relevant to Iranians and Persian-speakers, July 2011.
Percentage

Iranian web

Absolute numbers

25%

Alexa (Geoweb)

126 of 496 hosts

24%

Google Ad Planner (Advertiser’s)

370 of 1,525 hosts

16%

Likekhor (Blogger’s)

397 of 2,541 hosts

12%

Donbaleh/Sabzlink (Crowd-sourced)

535 of 4,579 hosts

11%

Balatarin (Crowd-sourced)

116 of 1,102 hosts
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Table 2: Metrics commonly used in national web characterization studies according to Baeza-Yates et al., 2007.
Bold indicates metrics used in this study, but we analyze the top-level domain rather than the second-level
domain.
Content

Link

Technology

Language

Degree

URL length

Page size

Ranking

HTTP response code

Page age

Web structure

Media and document formats

Pages per site

Image formats

Sites & pages per domain

Sites that cannot be crawled correctly

Second-level domain

Web server software
Programming languages for dynamic pages

ing whether websites are “parked” or “hacked” may
serve as measures of abandonment by previous owners.
Compared against proxy data, parked or abandoned
site analysis may be used to make claims about the
effectiveness of censorship, or suppression of voice.
Fitness could refer to the “validity” of code, or correct
implementation; Baeza-Yates and colleagues refer to
site structure, and its “correctness” for a crawler. Other
metric types more in the realm of political economy
that are of interest to us in expanded undertakings are
available. For example, media, document and image
formats could give us an indication of the extent to
which a national web is proprietary, which from certain
perspectives is a health issue.

in total, are in Persian; English is second with one of
five. Of interest are the proportions of Persian used in
the various webs. The results show that the blogger’s
space, Likekhor, is on top with 91 percent of the sources in Persian, followed by Alexa’s Iran-based surfer’s
web with 83 percent and the crowd-sourced web with
73 percent. At the bottom are the advertiser’s web with
62 percent, and Google Web Search with 52 percent.
Balatarin, the special case, has 75 percent in Persian.
Thus there is significant difference between the webs,
including, notably, a Persian-dominant blogosphere (if
the Likekhor list may serve as a short-hand reference
to such).7

One basic metric seeks to measure the composition of
languages in the Iranian web (see Figure 2). Persian
is of course the official language in Iran; the Unicode
system incorporated Persian script in 2001, and it can
be detected (Amir-Ebrahimi, 2008). For language
detection of websites we built a custom tool that makes
use of alchemyAPI’s language detection functionality, and is able to detect Persian as well as the other
languages, though not all languages spoken in Iran, as
we relate.5 In a second step, the results are manually
checked.6 Two out of three sites in the Iranian web,

Here we can begin to discuss the kinds of webs that
one were to capture and analyze if one were to define
the Iranian web or an Iranian website a priori, and seek
it according to a formal definition, a subject matter
raised earlier with respect to the web archivist’s formal
conditions of a national website (in the Dutch example)
as well as the survey respondents’ ideas of a national
web (for Iran). The blogosphere and to a slightly lesser
extent the geoweb (based on surfers in Iran) are most
closely related to ideas of an Iranian web as Persianspeaking only, though in that case between them there
still would be an average of more than 10 percent of
the non-Persian websites to be reckoned with. The
Iranian webs with larger percentages of non-Persian
sites are the advertiser’s as well as the regional web

5 The language auto-detection functionality is provided by alchemyAPI,
which for academic researchers allows 30,000 queries per day. The tool is at
http://www.alchemyapi.com/api/lang
6 We manually checked the results which returned sites as English or unknown, and corrected any errors. We have not explored further why duallanguage sites are considered as one particular language by alchemyAPI.
We also would consider using Google Translate as a language detector. The

‘unknown’ tags in the cloud indicate that neither the language detection tool
nor the researcher was able to determine the language, for in most cases the
site was no longer online.
7 Additionally, the Iranian webs show various degrees of language distribution, with Alexa being the least diverse with six languages and Google Web
Search the most with 36 languages.

The Iranian web and its
languages
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Languages on the Iranian web

Percentage  of  URLs  in  a  given  language

100

Other
Spanish

80
Turkish

60

Arabic
German

40
Unknown

20

English
Persian

0

Blogger's web
(Likekhor)

Surfer’s geoweb
(Alexa)

Crowd-sourced web
Crowd-sourced web
Searcher's web
Advertiser's web
(Balatarin)
(Google Ad Planner) (Google Web Search) (Donbaleh and Sabzlink)

Iranian  web  types

Figure 2: The distribution of languages on the Iranian web, August 2011. Graphic by the Digital Methods
Initiative, Amsterdam.

(from Google’s advanced search region option). The
advertiser’s is the web accessed by Persian speakers as
detected by the signals Google compiles on its users
and the content it indexes (Google Ad Planner). Both
have far higher percentages of non-Persian sites, especially English, though we did not attempt to investigate
whether these sites are authored by Iranians, or concern
Iranian affairs, however that may be defined.
There is another web one could conceive of a priori,
which also would have implications for the method by
which one would construct the object of study. Being
all-inclusive in terms of the languages spoken in Iran
(Armenian, Assyrian Neo-Aramaic, Azeri, Kurdish,
Lori, Balochi, Gilaki, Mazandarani, Arabic and Turkmen) has consequences for the capturing techniques;
of the secondary languages spoken in Iran, the language detection tool employed in this study detects
only Armenian, Arabic and Azeri, and not Assyrian
Neo-Aramaic, Kurdish, Lori, Balochi, Gilaki, Mazandarani or Turkmen. To compile such sites, one would
rely on specialists’ link lists, though we did not pursue
the matter any further.

The Iranian web and
responsiveness
To analyze the responsiveness of the Iranian webs
we retrieved the HTTP response status codes (of the
some 10,000 unique hosts) from the Netherlands with a
custom-built tool. The inputs to the tool are the lists of
hosts per web that previously were collected. Analyzing the results returned by the response code tool, we
found that there are eight commonly returned codes in
the Iranian web spaces (see Figure 3).8 The 400 class
of status codes indicates that the client has erred; “404
not found” (which means that the content is no longer available) is considered the strongest indication
of unresponsiveness. “400 bad request” means that
there was an error in the syntax, and “403 forbidden”
indicates that the server is refusing to respond. Commonly returned response codes besides the “200 OK”
status (standard successful HTTP response) are two
redirecting response codes: “301 moved permanently”
and “302 found.” Redirecting is not necessarily an indication of unresponsiveness, and can have a range of
reasons, including forwarding multiple domain names
to the same location, redirecting short aliases to longer
8 The http status codes are explained on the dedicated Wikipedia entry,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_HTTP_status_codes (accessed 14 July
2011).
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The health of the Iranian web

Advertiser's web
(Google Ad Planner)

Blogger's web
(Likekhor)

Surfer’s geoweb
(Alexa)

Other
502 Bad Gateway
500 Internal Server Error
410 Gone
404 Not Found
403 Forbidden
401 Unauthorized
400 Bad Request
0 Connection Problem

Searcher's web
(Google Web Search)

Crowd-sourced web
(Balatarin)

Crowd-sourced web
(Donbaleh and Sabzlink)

200 OK

Figure 3: The health of the Iranian webs measured by HTTP response codes in the Netherlands, August
2011. Graphic by the Digital Methods Initiative, Amsterdam.

URLs, or moving a site to a new domain.9 It also may
be an indication of a parked website. However, redirects also may be “soft 404” messages to hide broken
links (Yossef et al., 2004). In the current study, both
301 and 302 were followed if a location header was returned, which mostly resolved in 200 and 404 response
codes. “0 connection problem” indicates that the tool
was unable to connect to the server; the server may no
longer exist, or it may mean that that the site did not
respond within 60 seconds.
The findings of this portion of the study indicate, first,
that the Iranian webs are relatively healthy overall.
The crowd-sourcing webs of Donbaleh/Sabzlink and
Balatarin have 92 and 94 percent of the sites resolving, respectively. The advertiser’s space, followed by
the blogger’s space, delivered by Google Reader users, have the cleanest bills of health, with 96 and 95
9 URL redirection is explained on the dedicated Wikipedia entry, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/URL_redirection (accessed 14 July 2011).
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percent of the websites resolving. Thus the vibrancy
of the (Persian-language) advertiser’s space and the
blogosphere as well as the crowd-sourced webs is a
finding.

The Iranian web and Internet
censorship
Arguably, web devices are among the most well-informed censorship monitoring instruments. Search
engines and platforms receive requests for deleting
content—either specific URLs, specific queries or
more general instructions—thereby inviting the creation of an ongoing blacklist as well as a censorship
index. For example, it has been reported that to adhere
to Chinese government censorship instructions (prior
to the redirect to .com.hk), Google engineers “set up a
computer inside China and programmed it to try to access websites outside the country, one after another. If
a site was blocked by the firewall, it meant the government regarded it as illicit so it became part of Google’s
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Figure 4: Iranian traffic to YouTube comes to a standstill after the 2009 presidential elections.
Source: Google, 2011b.

blacklist” (Thompson, 2006). In the case of the Iranian
web, which is among the most aggressively censored
webs in the world, there are no reported requests for
removal from the government (Open Net Initiative,
2009; Google, 2011b). The graph in Figure 4, however,
shows how Iranian traffic to YouTube increased in the
run-up to the presidential elections in June 2009, before coming to an almost complete standstill one day
after. The question of interest in this study is to what
extent blocking important sites has had on the health
of the Iranian webs. In the following, the Iranian webs
collected are checked for availability inside Iran by using proxies. Subsequently, these findings are compared
against the basic health measures, responsiveness and
freshness. As mentioned above, one of the more remarkable findings is that a large portion of the Iranian
blogs is blocked, yet continues to respond, and is fresh.
The Censorship Explorer tool, which we have made
available at http://tools.digitalmethods.net/beta/proxies/, lists (fresh) proxies by country, and may be used
to check for censored websites. The tool returns website response codes, or loads the actual websites in
the browser, as if you were in the chosen country in
question. As a starting point in the censorship research
procedure, one often checks website responsiveness in
a country that is not known to censor (Iranian) websites (in this case, the Netherlands). Subsequently, one
runs lists of hosts through proxies in Iran, and logs the
response codes. If the response code is 403 forbidden,
while the response code is 200 OK when connected

from the Netherlands, it is understood as a strong indication that a site is blocked.10 Although testing via
proxies does not guarantee a replication of the average
user experience, response code checks through proxies
give indications of specific types of Internet censorship, i.e., URL and IP blocking through techniques
such as TCP/IP header filtering, TCP/IP content filtering and HTTP proxy filtering (Murdoch and Anderson,
2008). (There are other known filtering techniques that
are more accurately detected by other means, including DNS tampering and partial content filtering.) Often
multiple proxies are used, allowing the researcher to triangulate proxy results and increase the trustworthiness
of the results. For example, “0 Connection Problem”
may be a proxy problem, but may just as well be that
the censors return an RST (reset) p ackage, which resets the connection, effectively dropping it (Villeneuve,
2006).
10 Typically, when an Iranian proxy returns 403 forbidden for a particular site,
one is presented with an iframe loading http://10.10.34.34/?type=Invalid%20
Site&policy=MainPolicy which 30 seconds later redirects to http://peyvandha.ir, the site run by Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. The
former is only accessible from within Iran, and the latter contains a directory
of recommended or approved sites, a list of reasons for banning a site, and
a form to report a website thought to be in violation of the Iran’s computer
crimes law. While in this study we used response codes as strong indicators
of blocked sites, we also conducted additional tests concerning the relationship between the 403 forbidden response and the presence of the block page
URL. For blocked sites common to at least three lists (our test sample), we
found that a 403 would be accompanied by a block page. It also may be
noted that that http://peyvandha.ir ranks in the top 5 of Alexa’s (surfer’s)
geoweb. As blocked sites redirect there, the site’s high ranking provides
a relative measure of the amount of traffic to blocked sites from within
Iran.
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Comparing multiple proxies can aid in confirming it
is not a proxy problem. We used 12 proxies, which
are hosted in six different cities in Iran and operated
by a variety of owners, including Sharif University of
Technology and the popular Internet service provider
Pars Online. Concern has been voiced that it is “false
to consider internet filtering as an homogeneous phenomenon across a country,” considering that both the
implemen Typically, when an Iranian proxy returns 403
forbidden for a particular site, one is presented with an
iframe loading http://10.10.34.34/?type=Invalid%20
Site&policy=MainPolicy which 30 seconds later redirects to http://peyvandha.ir, the site run by Ministry
of Culture and Islamic Guidance. The former is only
accessible from within Iran, and the latter contains a
directory of recommended or approved sites, a list of
reasons for banning a site, and a form to report a website thought to be in violation of the Iran’s computer
crimes law. While in this study we used response codes
as strong indicators of blocked sites, we also conducted
additional tests concerning the relationship between the
403 forbidden response and the presence of the block
page URL. For blocked sites common to at least three
lists (our test sample), we found that a 403 would be
accompanied by a block page. It also may be noted that
that http://peyvandha.ir ranks in the top 5 of Alexa’s
(surfer’s) geoweb. As blocked sites redirect there, the
site’s high ranking provides a relative measure of the
amount of traffic to blocked sites from within Iran. tation and user experience of censorship may vary by
city, ISP, or even by computer (Wright et al., 2011: 5).
Taking note of this concern, we selected proxies from
different cities and ISPs, and subsequently considered
the response code returned by the majority.

The results show that approximately 5 percent of the
searcher’s web (179 out of 3547), 6 percent of the
geoweb (29 out of 496) and 16 percent of the advertiser’s web (238 out of 1,525 hosts) are blocked. The
crowd-sourced web has just over 50 percent of the web
blocked, with 2,382 of 4,579 hosts. Balatarin is the
most aggressively censored Iranian web space with 57
percent blocked, or 623 of 1,102 hosts, followed by the
other two crowd-sourcing platforms—Donbaleh and
Sabzlink—with more than half of the hosts blocked.
Google Reader’s web, which in the research work thus
far is standing in for the Iranian blogosphere, has 1,127
of 2,541 sites (44 percent) returning the “403 forbidden” code (see Figure 5).

The proxies used for this research:

Having identified the spaces of particular interest to
us (crowd-sourced as well as the blogger’s webs), and
finding that they are highly responsive as well as heavily blocked, we are interested in pursuing further the
question of whether censorship kills content. Or, despite
having their sites censored, do the bloggers keep on
blogging, and does the crowd keep posting, and rating?
Is there an expectation that the readers can routinely
circumvent censorship, and thus the content can continue to be recommended, commented on, etc.? Apart
from the responsiveness test (which found nearly all of
the websites online), we would like to know whether
they are active. Is the content on the websites fresh?
We are studying a subset of the webs—the blocked
sites in the crowd-sourced and the blogger’s webs. To
determine how fresh these sites are, for each host (per

217.219.115.133:80

ITC, Tehran, Esfahan

91.98.137.196:80

Sharif University of
Technology, Sharif,
Khuzestan

78.39.55.11:3128

ITC, Fars, Shiraz

91.98.137.196:3128

Pars Online, Tehran, Esfahan

80.191.120.129:3128

ITC, Tehran

213.217.43.82:8080

Pars Online, Pars, Tehran

217.219.115.137:80

ITC, Tehran, Esfahan

217.219.97.11:3128

ITC, Shiraz, Fars

80.191.122.11:3128

ITC, Shiraz, Fars

80.191.227.243:3128

ITC, Ahwaz, Khuzestan

188.136.241.2:3128

Ariana Gostar Spadana, Esfahan,

188.136.156.116:3128

Ariana Gostar Spadana, Gostar,
Hamadan
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As discussed above, the blogger’s web is largely Persian language, and is one of the most responsive of all
the webs under study, with 95 percent of the sites returning 200 OK response codes. Moreover, it speaks for
the use of Google Reader usage as a vibrant censorship
circumvention culture. This study appears to render
visible censorship circumvention at a large scale, or
at least blocked websites are still online. Of the webs
checked for filtering, the crowd-sourced sites as well
as the Likekhor listing are the most blocked, raising
the question not only of the substance of those spaces
(we treat Balatarin’s below), but also the convenience
of the platforms as URL lists for monitoring. Whilst
many sites are blocked, and still responsive, we are
interested in examining those blocked sites for other
signs of health: Are they fresh? If the sites are blocked,
yet responsive and fresh, we have a strong indication of
the ineffectiveness of censorship (to date).

The Iranian web and freshness
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list) we ask the Google feed API (application programming interface) whether each site has a feed (e.g., RSS
or atom). If it does, we parse the feed with the Python
Universal Feed Parser library and extract the date of the
latest post.11 Overall, 63 percent (5,147 of the 8,222) of
the three webs have feeds. Of the blocked sites in these
webs, 71 percent (2,986 of the 4,189) has a feed. For
Balatarin, the percentage of blocked sites with a feed is
79 percent (504 of 639 blocked hosts), for Donbaleh/
Sabzlink 68 percent (1,630 of 2,413) and for Likekhor
75 percent (852 of 1,137). These are the sites to be
checked for freshness.
What constitutes a fresh site? We turned to blog
search engines for advice about staleness. In an FAQ
about blog quality guidelines, Technorati states that
they “only index 30 days’ content, so anything older
than that will not appear on Technorati” (Technorati,
2011). Similarly, search engine and analytics system
for blogs—Blogpulse—takes 30 days as a measure
of fresh content: “A blog’s rank is based on a moving
average of its citation counts over the past 30 days”
(Blogpulse, 2011). Thus, freshness is here considered
as having at least one post published via a feed in the
last month, counted from the moment we last checked
for blockage. Would we expect these sites to be fresh?
To draw our findings into stark relief, it is of interest to
note that the well-known survey conducted by Technorati in 2008 found that only about 7 million of the
11 The Universal Feed Parser downloads structured data feeds of many
kinds, including RSS, Atom and CDF. It extracts post attributes, such as
title, author, description, timestamp and link.
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133 million blogs it follows had been updated in the
past four months. The New York Times wrote that the
finding implied that “95 percent of blogs [were] essentially abandoned, left to lie fallow on the Web, where
they become public remnants of a dream—or at least an
ambition—unfulfilled” (Quenqua, 2009). In this event
we have found that 65 percent of the sites overall are
fresh. In the crowd-sourcing platform Balatarin, 78 percent of the blocked hosts that have a feed (395 of 504
hosts) are fresh; in the crowd-sourcing web organized
by Donbaleh and Sabzlink, 56 percent of the blocked
hosts with a feed (915 of 1,630 hosts) are fresh. For
the Likekhor list, 61 percent—or 525 hosts—have a
post date of a month before they were tested and found
blocked. The results confirm that there is hardly a
general indication that censorship kills content on the
Iranian web under study. On the contrary, the most
severely censored Iranian webs are both responsive and
rather fresh.

The Iranian web:
Voice and expression
A substantive portion of the research project, touched
upon in the introduction, concerns employing the web
in order to gain indications of conditions on the ground.
Indeed, it is another “health check” in the sense that we
are interested in the strength of voice, and degrees of
expression in hard times. Has voice been suppressed
and expression become more dulled online over the past
few years? How would one make a measure of such?
This particular piece of research builds upon the work
Relative size of the Iranian web collection
Relative quantity of blocked URLs

Crowd-sourced web Crowd-sourced web
(Balatarin)
(Donbaleh and Sabzlink)

Blogger’s web
(Likekhor)

Advertiser’s web
Surfer’s geoweb
(Google Ad Planner)
(Alexa)

Searcher’s web
(Google Web Search)

Figure 5: Censorship on the Iranian web, as measured through the share of 403 forbidden HTTP response
codes. Data collected by the Censorship Explorer tool, Digital Methods Initiative (DMI), Amsterdam.
Graphic by DMI.
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on the Iranian blogosphere by John Kelly and Bruce
Etling (2008). Prior to the 2009 elections, and the “color uprising” known as the green movement, they wrote
about the repression in Iran, and argued that the Iranian
blogosphere organizes voice in a particular way:
Given the repressive media environment in
Iran today, blogs represent the most open
public communications platform for political discourse. The peer-to-peer architecture
of the blogosphere is more resistant to capture
or control by the state than the older, hub and
spoke architecture of the mass media model,
and if Yochai Benkler’s theory about the networked public sphere is correct in relation to
blogs, then the most salient political and social issues for Iranians will find expression and
some manner of synthesis in the Iranian blogosphere. Future research could address whether
or not this is true (Kelly and Etling, 2008:24).
We would like to inquire into “expression” by employing data from arguably the most significant Iranian
website of the past four years, Balatarin. Balatarin, as
discussed above, is considered here to be a set of URLs
collected through a particular device culture. One of
its salient features is the organization of the database
that has been built up over time. Amongst other data
held, Balatarin has the date that each URL was posted
on its site since 2006. We scraped Balatarin’s database
in order to obtain the top URLs (from all topic categories) that appeared on the crowd-sourced platform,
and the dates of their appearances. Subsequently, we
downloaded the pages that were linked to from within
the Balatarin posts, so as to be able to query them for
a series of words, effectively making the work desktop
research (searching for words). Our word list is comprised of what in Persian are called “smelly” words,
or language that would be considered critical and out
of order these days (see appendix).12 We have devised
12 The Persian term for “smelly” language referred to here is رادوب. The
word list was created through a collaboration by nearly 20 Iranian bloggers,
whose blogs have been blocked by the state over the past three years. When
their blogs were blocked, they began to compile a list of “smelly” words,
such as open letter, manifesto, opposition party and political prisoner. To
check the sensitivity (or, in our terms, fieriness) of the words, they would
query each in google.com (http://google.com/search?q=smelly_word). If
google.com was not blocked, and the query result was, then the term was
considered censored (and indeed sensitive). Note that a blocked query result
containing the fiery key word was not a criterion for inclusion on the word
list, but rather an indication employed by the bloggers. It should be noted
too that the words on the list are generally politically sensitive terms rather
than routinely blacklisted key words related to alcohol, sex, etc., however

Page 16

a scheme of term types that we thought would allow
us to judge the effects of the suppression over time
on voice and expression. We compiled 539 words,
which included terms and phrases, as well as names
of individuals. For the analysis, we used 235 of the
539, leaving aside phrases as well as many individuals’ names, with certain exceptions such as Neda and
Mousavi (see Figure 6). The list was sub-divided into
three categories (a word can fall into multiple categories): fiery, side-taking, and coded. By fiery language,
we mean language that would be (nearly intentionally)
incendiary. If used, it would lead to the censoring of a
blog or website. Side-taking language refers to terms
that show (obvious) affiliation or alignment. The
analysis of side-taking language enables not only an
indication of the increasing partisanship of Balatarin
(and the URLs its users recommend), but also to gain a
sense of which language continues to be expressed, and
which not, also as more and more websites are blocked
by the state. Has that situation changed in the sense
that more care is now taken in word choice? By coded
or unspoken language, we specifically focus attention
on language that is employed so as to not be blocked,
or raise ire.
All of the words on the three lists have been chosen
for their significance as forms of expression regarding
some of “the most salient political and social issues
for Iranians,” as Kelly and Etling phrased it (2008:24).
Our differentiation between types of words (fiery, sidetaking and coded) was made so as to gain a sense of
behavioral changes, such as the rise of coded language
together with the decline of the use of fiery words, to
give one example. Also, would oppositional voices
grow weary, or move underground (and use fewer sidetaking words)? Would the use of coded words become
more prevalent as censorship (and harsher) activities
expand?
We phrase our study as one concerning the organization
of voice. In particular, we are interested in what we term
the strength, clarity and volume of that voice, which we
described above as continued usage of words over time,
the choice of fiery and side-taking words over coded
ones, and the sheer numbers of websites containing
the words, respectively. Generally speaking, we found
much the latter have been the object of study in larger inquiries into Internet censorship in Iran (Open Net Initiative, 2005; 2009). The choice of
politically sensitive terms fits with our aim, which is not so much the general study of Internet censorship in Iran but rather the robustness of Iranian
online expression of salient political and social issues.
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that the use of the malodorous words has not declined,
but rather has held steady, and actually increased, over
the past three summers (2009-2011). As with fiery language, the use of side-taking language grew in volume
over the years. Instead of self-censorship (of the fiery
language), a greater use of coded words over time, or
the quieting of side-taking, we found louder and louder
voices, using all word types more and more frequently.
The finding is all the more remarkable for the fact that
there has been a concomitant rise in the blocking of
the sites where the language is published. As sites are
blocked, they are not dulled, but rather enlivened.

in those same months in 2010 and 2011. (The words
are held constant; we generally do not add new smelly
words as they become en vogue.) Focusing on the
summer of 2009, around the date of the elections, there
is, as expected, a significant rise in the use of fiery and
side-taking (as well as coded) language after the elections on June 12, 2009. However, instead of a decline
in subsequent years, as energies may flag and suppression spread, there is, as noted, only a rise in usage. The
use of words termed fiery in the websites linked from
Balatarin rose from 139,781 in June and July 2009 to
167,735 in June and July 2010 to 252,986 in June and
July 2011. There is not only an absolute but a relative
increase. No general chilling effect was observed for
the other critical language used on websites that rose
to the top on Balatarin. The use of side-taking language
increased from 365,602 occurrences in June and July

That is, an exploration of the data shows not a decline
but a general rise in the use of all of our language types
over time, comparing their occurrence in the websites
posted on Balatarin between June and July 2009, and
Fiery Language 2011
Statistics for 2011-06-01 - 2011-08-01
139 distinct words recognized
249546 = the sum of word occurences (each word is only counted once per post)
89948 non-deleted and scraped posts
51412 posts with at least one fiery word
54169 posts with a blocked host
34252 posts with a blocked host and at least one fiery word

Color depicts the percentage of blocked hosts containing a particular word
0% - 20%
20% - 40%
40% - 60%
60% - 80%
80% - 100%

The tag cloud represents the percentage of posted links a particular word appears in.
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Figure 6: The “redacted web” in Iran. The use of Persian fiery language on web pages linked from Balatarin.com, June
- July 2011, with English translation. The darker the color, the higher the percentage of blocked hosts containing the
word. Graphic by the Digital Methods Initiative, Amsterdam. Data and additional graphics available at http://mappingiranonline.digitalmethods.net/.
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2009 to 444,592 in June and July 2010 to 620,883 in
June and July 2011. The use of coded language rose
from 69,911 in June and July 2009 to 73,589 in June
and July 2010 to 103,013 in June and July 2011.
There is a series of observations. At least for the web
(and the voice) that Balatarin organizes, there is hardly
a general indication of self-censorship. On the contrary, the words are to be found by censors (judging
by the percentage of the same sites that have received
their attention), and are in full view. We also appear to
have found further indication of a hardy audience for
the language, and perhaps routine censorship circumvention, if we assume that much of the readership for
the fiery, side-taking and coded words is also in Iran.
The use of critical language has increased, and the sites
where the terms appear these days are widely blocked,
showing a high rate of censorship activity and perhaps
a concentration of monitoring of Balatarin. We are
not able to report on specific trends in censoring sites
which contain such language, as our censorship data
are from August, 2011 only. Nevertheless, the overall
findings are rather clear. It is a responsive web, blocked
yet blogging, likely with an active readership, not only
outside but also inside Iran. It would be worthwhile to
collect the URLs as they pass through Balatarin (as well
as Likekhor), and check for filtering simultaneously. If
sites are already blocked when recommended, we have
another strong indication of a culture of Internet censorship circumvention, in that there is an expectation
that one is able to route around the blockage and access
the sites.

Conclusion: National web
health index
In this study we have sought to build upon national web
characterization studies, and put forward the emerging
field of national web studies. We have done so first and
foremost by making a methodological plea for capturing and analyzing the diversity of national web spaces,
or webs. Rather than predefining national websites, and
thereby national webs, according to a principled approach of formal properties (for instance, all websites
with ccTLD .ir, all websites in Persian with Iran-related content, or websites with authors inside Iran), we
have concluded that such approaches are often not to
be operationalized or automated. Instead we propose
to make use of what we term “device cultures,” and
in particular the Iranian web spaces they provide, as
the blogger’s web, the advertiser’s, the searcher’s, the
crowd’s and the surfer’s. Device cultures more specifiPage 18

cally are defined as the interaction between user and
engine, the data that are routinely collected, how they
are analyzed, and ultimately the URL recommendations
that result. We have demarcated national webs through
devices that “go local;” they have location or language
added as a value that sifts URLs that are of relevance
to Iranians and Persian-speakers. In an examination of
the data sets, where we performed top-level domain
analysis of the sample, we have found that the majority
of the collected hosts from the various Iranian webs
are .com websites, not .ir, a finding that expanded the
scope of national domain characterization studies, and
introduced a method of data collection for a broader
national web studies.
Second, both building on as well as contributing to
national web characterization studies, we have proposed a rationale: a national web health index. It is
conceptualized as a series of metrics, a limited number
of which we have employed in this study, most readily responsiveness, page age and filtering or blockage.
(We also performed language detection and top-level
domain analysis.) The contribution of this work to national web characterization studies is two-fold. The
first is conceptual, in that we propose to repurpose
metrics from national web characterization for n ational
web health indices. Are websites responding? Are pages fresh? Are links broken? Is the code valid? Are file
formats proprietary? A form of country profiling comes
into view. The second is generalizable for countries
that face state censorship, and applicable to our case
study in question, Iran. We compare the results from
the responsiveness tests to the filtering ones. Are the
blocked sites still responsive? The approach led us to
find a significant number of blogs which were blocked,
yet still responsive. The finding of so many blocked
yet blogging sites also indicates an audience for the
content, both outside Iran but also inside. We believe
there to be widespread Internet circumvention in a
particular space: the predominantly Persian-language
blogosphere authored by Likekhor and Google Reader,
which in tandem serve as an important filter for Iranian blogs. Although heavily censored, the Iranian
blogosphere as listed by Likekhor remains vibrant.
This censored but active space is similar to the crowdsourced web organized by Balatarin. Blocked yet
posting, Balatarin’s recommended websites also suggest a similar finding as the one for the blogosphere:
an active audience for blocked websites. In additional,
substantive analysis we found that the Balatarin web
(as a collection of URLs highly rated and thus rising
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to the top of the platform) remains clamorous, perhaps
even more so now than after the presidential elections
of June 2009, and the initial rising of the green movement. Whilst roundly blocked, the websites comprising
that Iranian web are employing critical language that
is fiery, side-taking as well as coded (at least according to our three language category types we summoned
for the analysis). It is a web that does not appear to
be widely practicing self-censorship or one which has
been cowed and drained of spirit.
Third, we would like to mention certain implications of
national web studies as country profiling, both as it affects current and future policies with respect to the web
(and its study) and the use of web indicators for social
study more generally. As we alluded to, regarding our
early work on Iraq and the state of its web during the
Iraq War in 2007, national web health study provides
an additional set of measures regarding the current
state of the universities, ministries and other institutions. Where is the activity, and where is the neglect?
It also may serve as a source of comparative study, and
ultimately as a spur to addressing the ill health of one
or more webs. Thus it is an approach to the study of the
web that could have salutary consequences for portions
of it.
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Appendix

Persian queries
۲ خرداد
۲۲ خرداد
۲۵ بهمن
آتئیست
آخوندک
آزادگی
آزادی بیان
آزادیخواه
آهنگ
ن.ا
اتحاد
اتوبوس رانی
 بهمن۲۵ اخبار
استراتژی
اسکناس نویسی
اصانلو
اصحاب قدرت
۲۷ اصل
اصل والیت فقیه
اصالحات
اطالع رسانی
اطالعات سپاه
اعتصاب
اعتصاب غذا
اعدام
اعدامهای دسته جمعی
اعالمیه
اعالمیه سبز
اقتصادی
اگنوستیک
هللا اکبر شبانه
امپراطوری دروغ
انتخابات
انحصارطلب
انقالب
انقالب مخملی
اوین
بازجو
بازداشت
بازی وبالگی
باالترین
بحران
بدنه نظام
 الف۲ بند
 زندان اوین۲۰۹ بند
 اوین۳۵۰ بند
به پا خاستن

English translation
Khordad 2nd
Khordad 22nd
Bahman 25th
atheist
mantis
Azadegi
freedom of speech
liberal
music
A.N.
alliance
bus drivers union
news of Bahman 25th
strategy
writing on paper money (writing
slogans on paper money)
Mansour Osanloo OR Osanloo
the people in power
the 27th article of the Iranian
the principle of Guardianship of the
Islamic Jurists (velayat-e faqih)
reforms
spreading information
Sepah's intelligence service
strike
hunger strike
execution
mass executions
declaration
green declaration
economic
agnostic
nightly Allah O Akbar
empire of lies
election
monopolist
revolution
color revolution OR velvet revolution
Evin
interrogator
arrest
blogging rallies
Balatarin
crises
body of the system
section 2 A
section 209 of Evin Prison
section 350 of Evin Prison
uprising

Number of posts in
which the Persian
side
code
word appears
fiery taking language
652
1
0
0
4723
1
0
0
2132
0
1
0
291
1
1
0
180
1
0
1
3413
1
0
0
3837
0
1
0
1811
1
1
0
13415
0
1
0
2198
1
0
1
9664
1
1
0
252
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
3911
0
1
0
370
22
65
198

1
1
1
1

0
0
1
0

1
0
1
1

714
10960
12447
1326
17034
6503
20597
17
3795
61
35384
77
238
32
49469
79
51257
834
15630
903
33211
366
28890
18830
54
98
343
2987
38

0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0

1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
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بهایت
بهایی
۸۹ بهمن سال
بی خشونت
بیانیه
بیبیسی
پرونده سیاسی
پوستر
تاج زاده
تاکتیک
تجاوز
تجمعات
تشکیالت
تصرف
تصرف صدا و سیما
تظاهرات
تظاهرات سراسری
تظاهرات مردمی
تقلب
تقلب در انتخاب
تمامیت خواه
تمساح
تونس
جامعه
جامعه مدنی
جدایی دین از سیاست
جزوه
جمهوری ایرانی
جمهوری خواهی
جمهوری والیت فقیه
جنبش
جنگ گرگها
جین شارپ
حاکمیت
حبس خانگی
حسین بازجو
حسین شوش
حسین شیره ای
حقوق بشر
حقوق زنان
حکم
ر.خ
خاتمی
خاموشی سبز
خاوران
خرداد
خرید عید
خس و خاشاک
خشم
خفقان
دانلود
درگیری
دستگیری
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Baha'i Faith
Baha'i
January 2011
nonviolence (movements)
statement
BBC
political file
poster
Taj Zadeh
tactic
rape
gatherings
organizations
occupation
occupation of the national TV (IRIB)
demonstration
nationwide demonstration
people demonstration
fraud
elections fraud
totalitarian
alligator
Tunisia
society
civil society
separation of religion and politics
leaflet
Iranian Republic
republicanism
republic of Supreme Leader
movement
the wolves' war
Gene Sharp
rule
house arrest
interrogator Hossein
Hossein Shoosh
addicted Hossein
human rights
women's rights
sentence
Kh.R [G.R]
Khatami
Green Silence
Khavaran
Khordad
Nowruz shopping
a pile of dust
anger
suffocations
download
fighting
arrest

8
3698
13
8
20929
5361
18
3557
2754
1938
17211
3671
2321
6618
3
23143
79
351
10336
5
312
903
3851
49036
1945
242
800
15
4
99
35113
65
151
9752
2590
83
4
5
33448
3262
24191
752
26151
209
961
54343
50
3465
6782
2862
19786
15677
15318

1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0

0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
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دعوت
دعوت به راهپیمایی
دفاع
دگراندیش
دگرباش
دموکراسی
دهه شصت
دیکتاتور
دیکتاتور به پایان سالم کن
دین حکومتی
رادیو فردا
راه سبز امید
راهپیمایی
رای من کجاست
رسانههای سبز
رهانا
رهبران سبز
روز جهانی زن
روز کارگر
ریشه ها
زباله دانی تاریخ
زندان
زندان قرچک
زندان ورامین
زندان وکیل آباد مشهد
زندانی
زندانیان سیاسی
زید آبادی
ساندیس خور
سبز
سرپیچی
سرکوب
سطل زباله
سقوط
سکوالر
سلول انفرادی
سه شنبههای اعتراض
سهراب
سیاسی
سید ضیا نبوی
شبکه اجتماعی
شراب
شرایط بحرانی
شرایط ناگوار
شعار
شعار نویسی
شکنجه
شهادت
شورا
شورای راه سبز
شیخ شجاع
صانع
صانع ژاله

invite
inviting people to demonstration
defend
open minded
LGBT
democracy
80's
dictator
the end is near, dictator
official governmental religion
Radio Farda
the green path of hope
march
Where is my vote?
green media
Rahana
green leaders
intl. Women's Day
Labor Day
Risheha
dustbin of history
prison
Gharchak Prison
Varamin Prison
Vakil Abad Prison
prisoner
political prisoners
Zeidabadi
juice drinker
green
refusal
suppression
trash bin
collapse
secular
solitary
the Tuesday protests
Sohrab
political
Seyed Zia Nabavi
social network
wine
crisis conditions
terrible conditions
slogan
writing slogan
torture
martyrdom
council
the green way council
the brave sheikh
Sane'
Sane' Zhaleh

21793
77
31866
250
718
20
1772
12677
112
19
6394
6749
13952
421
1
1035
1069
1
390
696
59
37708
125
5
413
23505
17225
704
395
43200
494
18260
281
25283
2483
1384
64
8207
57438
361
2149
1657
540
31
18340
972
12450
15885
3869
269
929
983
653

0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1

1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
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صدای آمریکا
صندوق رای
ضرب و شتم
ظلم و جور
۸۸ عاشورای
عدالت اجتماعی
علوم انسانی
علی شیره ای
غیر مسلحانه
فروپاشی
فشار اجتماعی
فعاالن سیاسی
فعالیت سیاسی
فعالین
فیلترشکن
فیلم
قتل عام
قرنطینه
قزل قلعه
کذاب
کروبی
کشتار
کشتار جمعی
کمپین
کهریزک
کودتا
کودتاچیان
کوی دانشگاه
گزارش
گفتمان
الییک
لیبرال
مانیفست
مبارزان آزادی
مبارزه
مبارزه بی خشونت
مجاهدین خلق
مجاهدین
محکومیت
مخالف رژیم
مختاری
مرگ بر
مزدوران
مستبدانه
مسلحانه
مشروب
مشروعیت
مصر
مطالبات مردم
مطبوعاتی
مطلقه
معترضان
معترضین
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VOA
voting box
beating
oppression
Aushura 88
social justice
humanities
addicted Ali
unarmed
collapse
social pressure
political activists
political activity
activists
proxy-server as anti-filtering
video clip
genocide
quarantine
Ghezal Ghaleh
liar
Karrubi
massacre
mass destruction
campaign
Kahrizak
coup
coup providers
Tehran universitary dormitary
report
discourse
secular
liberal
manifesto
freedom fighters
struggle
nonviolent struggle
People's Mujahedin of Iran (MKO)
mujahedin
sentence
opposition
Mokhtari
down with
mercenaries
arbitrary
armed
liquor
legitimacy
Egypt
people's demands
press
totalitarian
protesters
protesters

4379
510
8278
367
459
1369
5
105
15
3204
33
3138
1191
5912
1193
38021
5156
487
40
298
30413
10167
344
8687
6537
10461
1791
3233
72906
3430
86
1950
855
36
23879
1
1167
9895
7629
335
1276
8837
3883
187
3041
651
4579
14551
674
5253
4135
13326
2285

1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1

0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
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مقابله مدنی
مقاومت
مقاومت مدنی
مناظره
موسوی
میهن
نارضایتی
نافرمانی
نافرمانی مدنی
نامه
نامه سرگشاده
ندا
ندا آقا سلطان
نداها
نظام اوباش ساالر
نظام پوسیده
نظام منحوس
نقد مذهب
نهاد ارتجاعی والیت فقیه
نیشکر هفت تپه
هرانا
همبستگی
همجنس گرا
وزارت اطالعات
وطن
والیت مطلقه
یا حسین

civil disobedience
resistance
civilized resistance
debate
Mousavi
homeland
discontent
disobedience
civil disobedience
letter
open letter
Neda
Neda Agha Soltan
Nedas
uncouth regime
rotten regime
sinister regime
religion review
The reactionary velayat-faqih
Haft Tapeh Sugar Cane
HRANA
solidarity
homosexual
intelligence minister
homeland
absolute ruler
Ya Hossein (2nd Shia Imam name)

4
14843
237
6663
42838
6563
3776
2735
1903
54699
3734
11014
2458
474
2
29
14
17
6
74
2280
119
171
10012
10173
1046
1334

1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0

0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1

0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

Screenshot of block page, http://10.10.34.34, indicating that the web user in Iran has attempted to
access a banned website. Block page by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Iran, February,
2012, captured by the Censorship Explorer tool by the Digital Methods Initiative, Amsterdam.
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